Personhood

Does Frankfurt provide an adequate account of Personhood?

Frankfurt posits a necessary but not sufficient account by indicating that mere physical characteristics and certain states of consciousness do not constitute a person but rather higher order activities of a human will constitute personhood. It is not sufficient because he does not include morality as a component that is co-extensive (an idea that appears to follow logically from another as another pole on the same continuum) to will in order to make it higher ordered.

Frankfurt began his discourse by reacting to the concept of persons extant as the standard set by Strawson . He posited the idea that the entity that is described by the aforementioned is not sufficient to that which constitutes a person --sufficient is used as that which should be included to make a strong case. (Martinich 205) This he indicates is simply a description of physical characteristics (biological properties) and certain states of consciousness (psychological properties) Frankfurt opines that this concept can include “…human beings … animals of various lesser species as well.” (Frankfurt 1971, 5) He even concedes that a new entity may have been posited by Strawson but categorically indicates its radical distance to the entity called person.

In the study guide persons are defined as entities that “… are able of shaping their lives through their own free choices.” (Study Guide 205, 49) The exposition of Frankfurt meets the necessary conditions—t hat which disallows the argument from being weak— (A.P. Martinich 205, 113) of personhood because it deals with the will and its nuances that persons use to shape their own lives.

Frankfurt posits that the difference between creatures and persons is located in the structure of the will of the person. The essential component is that humans are able to form second-order desires. This class of desires (second-order) are derived from first-order desires which are also common to many animals. First-order desires are “simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another.” (Frankfurt 1971, 7) Second-order desires are the wanting of first order desires or the making of first-order desires ones will. It is interesting to note that Frankfrut considers the latter of the second-order class (making a first-order desire one’s will) “as essential to being a person.” (Frankfurt 1971, 10) Thus when choice is located in the will the shaping ones life is really free.

The conditionality of locating choice in will rather than in simply second-order desires creates a difference in human beings. It is possible according to Frankfurt that one can be human and not be a person. This is illustrated by a category of wanton.

“The essential characteristic of a wanton is that he does not care about his will. His desires move him to do certain things, without its being true of him either that he wants to be moved by those desires or that he prefers to be moved by other desires.” ( Frankfurt 1971, 11)

Hence it can be concluded that a wanton does not engaged second-order volitions (making a first-order desire one’s will) and thus the shape of his life is not his will. It follows that since his choices are not second-order volitions that he is not really free. “The enjoyment of free will means the satisfaction of certain desires—desires of the second-order or higher orders—whereas its absence means…frustration.” (Frankfurt 1971, 17)

The category of wanton makes a sharp contrast and adequately distinguishes what it is to be a person according to the above-mentioned definition. Thus Frankfurt meets the necessary condition of in his discourse on personhood.

It is interesting to note that Frankfurt did not consider overtly the apparent need in humans to be in pursuit of that which could be called the higher ordered good. In the following paragraphs I will endeavour to show its sufficiency to Frankfurt proposition on personhood

Moral responsibility is derived co-extensively from the exercise of the will. Let us assume that a wants to x and decides that x is his will. He is unable to x because of extenuating circumstances but he wants to want x. He bears no responsibility to himself for not being able to x.

But if a wants to x and makes x what he wants to want—this becomes his will—and refuses to act to x., then he bears responsibility to himself for wanting to want to x and it not acting to x in order to make his will effective. Though this responsibility is to self, is not less moral than a responsibility to provide for one’s children. For that which is ought, is not and can thus pervert the self as it can disadvantage one’s children.

This can be further illustrated in the example of a young man who wants to be a lawyer and has made it his will to go to law school. He acts on his will to make it effective and has complete law school. It stands that he has to take the bar exam in order to fulfill his desire to become a lawyer. He procrastinates about studying for the exam. He finally does the exam and fails badly and looses his desire to become a lawyer—his will has been broken. His procrastination led to failure and led to a broken will. It is interesting to note that unless he accepts responsibility for his procrastination and resulting failure, he cannot repair his will and thus become a lawyer. Thus moral perversion of the self in the interest of the self is coextensively derived from the will.

The converse is also true that a person who wants to study law and makes its his will and acts on it to make it effective by studying and passing the bar exam ennobles his will by having shaped his life. He esteems himself highly for having shape his life in accordance with his will—perceiving a good in himself-- and thus posturing himself towards the continuity of personhood.
The aforementioned fits easily with Frankfurt ideas of the freedom of the will. For he posits the following:

“The enjoyment of a free will means that the satisfaction of certain desires—desires of the second order or of higher orders—whereas its absence means their frustration. The satisfactions at stake are those which accrue to a person of whom it may be said that his will is his own.” (Frankfurt 1971, 17)

The perceive good that is had by the self after the satisfaction of higher desires is itself a supreme desire by the self to the self. This I think could be the reason that according to Frankfurt, “When a person identifies himself decisively with one of his first order desires this commitment resounds through out the potentially endless orders.” (Frankfurt 1971, 16) Thus this perceived good can bring satisfaction to limitless desires in a person. This may be the reason for Frankfurt assertion:

“It would be a mistake to claim that, because he has not considered whether he wants the second order volitions he has formed, he is indifferent to the question of whether it is with this volition or with some order that he wants his will to accord.” (Frankfurt 1971, 16)

Here one may conclude that the essence of human desires is the second order volition that one may consider good. It is true that one may argue that self deception is possible relative to the desire of the good. However, it is my view that even within this context of deception the human desire can temporarily find satisfaction of the good. When the deception is realized the human agent will encounter dissatisfaction and may to choose to employ corrective measures or not relative to the deception. If he does not the dissatisfaction will continue and if he does the good will produced satisfaction that may resound to the higher orders.

This makes the desire for the good a higher ordered desire that is derived coextensively from second order volitions. It also may be that Frankfurt hints at that in the following:

“But the conformity of a person’s will to his higher-ordered volitions may be far more thoughtless and spontaneous than this. Some people are naturally moved by kindness when they want to be kind, and by nastiness when they want to be nasty, without any explicit forethought and without any need for energetic self control.” (Frankfurt 1971, 17)

The issue of morality is dealt with polemically rather than co-extensively by Frankfurt. Hence his approached is a reaction to the debate about moral responsibility within the context of a free will. It is the view of Frankfurt that an enslave will does not exempt one from moral responsibility. This he illustrates by the following:

“The willing addict’s will is not free, for his desire to take the drug will be effective regardless of whether or not he wants this desire to constitute his will. But when he takes the drug, he takes it freely and of his own free will…This desire is his because he is psychologically addicted. But it is his effective desire also because he wants it to be. His will is outside his control, but, by his second-order desire for the drug should be effective, he has made this will his own. Given that it is therefore not only because of his addiction that his desire for the drug is effective, he may be morally responsible for taking the drug.” (Frankfurt 1971, 10-20)

It is interesting to note that the above reaction is to determinism which postulates that “that every event has a cause… (this is) understood to exclude the possibility of free will….” (A.P. Martinich 205, 190) Thus creating a tension between optimists and pessimists--optimists are those who support determinism and sees moral relevance and pessimists are those who opposed determinism because they cannot reconcile its natural outworking to moral responsibility. ( Strawson 1962) However, Strawson is postured in the direction of the co-extensive concept that I am proposing when he asserts:

“We must mention also the self-reactive attitudes of offenders themselves. Just as the other-reactive attitudes are associated with a readiness to acquiesce in the infliction of suffering on an offender, within the ‘institution’ of punishment, so the self-reactive attitudes are associated with a readiness on the part of the offender to acquiesce in such infliction without developing the reactions (e.g. of resentment) which he would normally develop to the infliction of injury upon him; i.e. with a readiness, as we say, to accept punishment(6) as ‘his due’ or as ‘just’.” ( Strawson 1962, 16)

This tends in the direction of accepting responsibility because of the higher ordered mechanism in the agent that finds social compatibility. I am of the view that it may as a result of this internal mechanism’s out-working, that the social reactive mechanisms discussed by Strawson finds definition.

In conclusion, I am of the view that Frankfurt provides the necessary condition for personhood, by locating its essence in the structure of the will. However, it was not sufficient since the hirer ordered desires of man co-extensively answers to the good.



REFERENCES


Frankfrut G. Harry, 1971 Freedom of The Will and Concept of a Person: The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 68. No. 1 (Jan. 14, 1971), 5-20

Martinich A.P., 205 Philosophical Writing, Blackwell Publishing, London, 113

Strawson P.F., 1962 Freedom and Resentment,http://www.ucl.ac.uk/~uctytho/dfwstrawson1.htm

Wright Peter, ed, 205 Study Guide, The Open University, 49